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Accommodating foreign competitors in a dynamic game model
of a productive asset oligopoly, this paper demonstrates that trade
liberalization in the form of foreign entry into the domestic market
unambiguously reduces welfare. We discuss that this result survives an
arbitrary number of domestic and foreign ¯rms, which exhibits a sharp
contrast to the static result that trade liberalization is gainful if the
foreign ¯rms su±ciently outnumber the domestic ¯rms. Then, we point
out that the above contrast comes from the presence of closed-loop
e®ects of feedback strategies.
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1 Introduction
Gains/losses from trade have received much attention in trade theory
and generated a large literature. It is widely recognized that trade is po-
tentially gainful as long as a static Arrow-Debreu model is supposed, e.g.,
Kemp and Wan (1972) and Grandmont and McFadden (1972). However,
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the opening of trade is no longer welfare-improving once some market dis-
tortion is allowed for. Imperfect competition is one of the typical market
distortions and its implications for welfare e®ects of trade have been ex-
tensively addressed.1)
This paper is also along this line of research, but our focus is on dy-
namic welfare implications of trade under oligopoly. In pioneering works,
Brander (1981), Markusen (1981), and Brander and Krugman (1983) show
that an oligopolistic market yields procompetitive gains from trade, but
that it may leave a country worse o® than under autarky depending on the
inter-country di®erence in cost and/or factor endowments. While this now-
classical argument rests on static settings, we revisit gains/losses from trade
in a dynamic context. For this purpose, we employ a dynamic oligopoly
model developed by Benchekroun (2008) who proves some counter-intuitive
results in an oligopoly under autarky. We extend his model to accom-
modate foreign ¯rms as well as domestic ¯rms.2) Trade liberalization is
modeled as an allowance of foreign entry throughout this paper.
Within this framework, we prove that losses from trade are inevitable in
feedback Nash equilibria. This is in sharp contrast to the static outcome
that trade is gainful if the number of foreign ¯rms is su±ciently larger
than that of domestic ¯rms. We discuss that the closed-loop properties of
feedback strategies play a key role behind our ¯nding.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 builds a basic model
and derives a Nash equilibrium under the linear feedback strategy. Section
3 proves losses from trade and compares our result with the static outcome
to better understand the implications of feedback strategies. Section 4
concludes the paper. Appendix brie°y shows losses from trade under the
1) See, for example, Helpman and Krugman (1985).
2) Benchekroun's (2008) model with an arbitrary number of ¯rms is based on a
duopolistic model of Benchekroun (2003).
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nonlinear feedback strategy to supplement the argument in the main text.
2 A model
Suppose a country, say Home, which produces and consumes two goods,
Goods 1 and 2. Both goods are produced from labor under constant re-
turns. Without loss of generality, one unit of labor produces one unit of
Good 2 (numeraire) so that the wage rate is ¯xed to unity. On the other
hand, in producing x units of Good 1, cx units of labor are employed,
where c ¸ 0. The domestic market of Good 1 is oligopolized by n ¸ 1
Home ¯rms and n¤ ¸ 0 Foreign ¯rms, all of which share the identical cost.
An asterisk (*) is attached to Foreign variables.
Assume a representative consumer that has a utility function:
u = aC1 ¡ C
2
1
2
+ C2 + bS; a > c > 0; b ¸ 0; (1)
where u is utility, Ci; i = 1; 2 the consumption of each good, and S the
stock of a common-pool resource. The assumption that b ¸ 0 implies
that the resource has a positive externality which can be called an amenity
value3) Utility maximization subject to the budget constraint yields a linear
demand function: C1 = a ¡ p, where p is the price of Good 1 in terms of
Good 2.
Each oligopolistic ¯rm chooses a time pro¯le of outputs to maximize the
discounted stream of pro¯ts subject to a di®erential equation of resource
accumulation. Formally, each ¯rm's optimization problem is formulated
by4)
3) The term `amenity value' owes to Sorger (2005).
4) Benchekroun (2008) uses a more general function of natural resource growth such
that the natural growth function is mountain-shaped, i.e., it has a peak at a certain
level of S. On the other hand, we follow Benchekroun and Long (2002, p. 210) who
state `when the two players are facing a low stock level, a linear approximation
may be a reasonable price to pay for tractability.' Tornell and Velasco (1992) and
Sorger (2005) also make the same assumption.
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max
xi
Z 1
0
e¡rt

a¡ c¡
X
xj ¡
X
x¤j

xidt; r > 0
subject to _S = kS ¡
X
xj ¡
X
x¤j ; k > 0; (2)
where r is a rate of discount, k a natural growth rate of the resource, and
xi a representative Home ¯rm's output. We omit explicitly considering a
Foreign ¯rm's problem since a parallel argument applies to it.
We derive the feedback Nash equilibrium of this di®erential game.5) To
this end, we employ a derivation method developed by Tsutsui and Mino
(1990) and Shimomura (1991).6) It begins by setting up ¯rm i's Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation:7)
rV (S) = maxxi
("
a¡ c¡ xi ¡
X
j 6=i
xj(S)¡
X
x¤j (S)
#
xi
+V 0(S)
"
kS ¡ xi ¡
X
j 6=i
xj(S)¡
X
x¤j (S)
#)
; (3)
where V (¢) is ¯rm i's value function:
V (S)´max
xi
8<:
Z 1
t
e¡r(¿¡t)
24a¡ c¡ xi¡X
j 6=i
xj(S)¡
X
x¤j (S)
35xid¿ 
_S = kS ¡ xi ¡
X
j 6=i
xj(S)¡
X
x¤j (S)
9=; :
Assuming an interior solution and maximizing the right-hand side in (3)
yield
V 0(S) = a¡ c¡ (n+ n¤ + 1)x(S); (4)
under the symmetry assumption that all the ¯rms produce x. Substituting
(4) into (3), we have an identity in S.
5) See Dockner et al. (2000) for detailed explanations of the solution concepts in
di®erential games.
6) Benchekroun and Long (2007) recently show that a Hamiltonian approach can be
used to reach the same result.
7) Rigorously speaking, ¯rm i's value function should be denoted by Vi(¢), but we drop
subscript i since we will focus on the symmetric equilibrium where xi = xj = x.
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rV (S) = [a¡ c¡ (n+ n¤)x(S)]x(S)
+[a¡ c¡ (n+ n¤ + 1)x(S)][kS ¡ (n+ n¤)x(S)]:
Di®erentiating both sides with respect to S and rearranging terms, we have
obtained the following auxiliary equation.
x0(S) =
(k ¡ r)[(n+ n¤ + 1)x(S)¡ (a¡ c)]
2(n+ n¤)2x(S)¡ k(n+ n¤ + 1)S ¡ (n+ n¤ ¡ 1)(a¡ c) : (5)
This equation implicitly gives the candidates for feedback strategies. Any
feedback Nash equilibrium strategy must satisfy (5) and the boundary
condition: limt!1 e¡rtV (S) = 0. In what follows, we make the following
assumption.8)
Assumption. 2k > r[(n+ n¤)2 + 1].
This assumption, which is necessary for purely technical reasons, requires
the renewable property to be su±ciently signi¯cant.
Since it is in general quite di±cult to explicitly solve (5), we end up
con¯ning attention to the feedback Nash equilibria the steady state of
which can be characterized analytically. As a ¯rst candidate, let us consider
a linear feedback strategy.9) Supposing each ¯rm's strategy is linear in S
such that x(S) = ®S + ¯, (5) reduces to
® =
(k ¡ r)[(n+ n¤ + 1)(®S + ¯)¡ (a¡ c)]
2(n+ n¤)2(®S + ¯)¡ k(n+ n¤ + 1)S ¡ (n+ n¤ ¡ 1)(a¡ c) ;
which is equivalent to
®

2(n+ n¤)2®¡ (2k ¡ r)(n+ n¤ + 1)S
+ ¯

2(n+ n¤)2®¡ (k ¡ r)(n+ n¤ + 1)
¡ [(n+ n¤ ¡ 1)®¡ (k ¡ r)] (a¡ c) = 0:
8) Similar conditions are also made in Benchekroun (2003, 2008).
9) Appendix deals with nonlinear feedback strategies which are proposed and applied
in the existing literature, e.g., Tsutsui and Mino (1990), Dockner and Long (1993),
and Itaya and Shimomura (2001).
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This equation allows us to ¯nd two pairs of (®; ¯):
(®; ¯) =

(2k ¡ r)(n+ n¤ + 1)
2(n+ n¤)2
;
f¡2k + r[(n+ n¤)2 + 1]g(a¡ c)
2(n+ n¤)2(n+ n¤ + 1)k

;

0;
a¡ c
n+ n¤ + 1

:
As Benchekroun (2008) demonstrates, the linear feedback strategy con-
sists of three segments by using the above two pairs of (®; ¯). It is alge-
braically summarized as
x(S) =
8>><>>:
0 if S · f2k¡r[(n+n¤)2+1]g(a¡c)
k(2k¡r)(n+n¤+1)2
(2k¡r)(n+n¤+1)
2(n+n¤)2 S +
f¡2k+r[(n+n¤)2+1]g(a¡c)
2(n+n¤)2(n+n¤+1)k if
f2k¡r[(n+n¤)2+1]g(a¡c)
k(2k¡r)(n+n¤+1)2 < S <
[(n+n¤)2+1](a¡c)
k(n+n¤+1)2
a¡c
n+n¤+1 if S ¸ [(n+n
¤)2+1](a¡c)
k(n+n¤+1)2
:
(6)
Although (6) takes a complicated form, its implication can be geometrically
grasped. It states that each ¯rm chooses zero (resp. static) output if the
resource stock is su±ciently small (resp. large). On the other hand, the
output is linearly increasing in S for the intermediate level of S. This is
depicted in Figure 1.
O SL
S
x(S)
x2
x1
x
′(S) = 0
S˙ = 0
x′(S) =∞
C
L
N
SN SC
x
N
Figure 1: Feedback Nash equilibrium
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In Figure 1, there are three auxiliary lines: x0(S) = 0; x0(S) = 1
and _S = 0. On locus x0(S) = 0 (resp. x0(S) = 1), the numerator (resp.
denominator) in (5) is zero. And line _S = 0 gives the steady state condition:
kS ¡ (n + n¤)x = 0. Above (resp. below) line _S = 0, S decreases (resp.
increases) over time. Then, one can add two linear strategies, x1 which
corresponds to the former of (®; ¯) obtained above and x2 which is a static
output.
Figure 1 tells that there are two steady states C and L associated with
linear strategies. However, as is clear from the ¯gure, only L is asymptoti-
cally stable. This implies that a static Cournot-Nash output is no longer an
equilibrium strategy and only x1 survives. Under strategy x1, the steady
state resource stock is obtained as SL in the ¯gure, which is explicitly
derived as
STL =
(n+ n¤)¯
k ¡ (n+ n¤)® =

2k ¡ r[(n+ n¤)2 + 1]	 (a¡ c)
k(n+ n¤ + 1)[2k ¡ r(n+ n¤ + 1)] ; (7)
by considering the steady state condition with the linear strategy _S =
kS ¡ (n+ n¤)(®S + ¯) = 0. In (7), subscript L and superscript T respec-
tively stand for the linear feedback Nash equilibrium and the free trade
equilibrium.
This section is closed by deriving the steady state value of S under
autarky. As mentioned earlier, autarky is expressed by n¤ = 0, which
makes (7) take the form of
SAL =
[2k ¡ r(n2 + 1)](a¡ c)
k(n+ 1)[2k ¡ r(n+ 1)] ; (8)
where superscript A indicates autarky.
3 Losses from trade
Having derived the feedback Nash equilibrium in free trade and autarky,
this section proceeds to considering whether the opening of trade is ben-
e¯cial to Home. First of all, let us de¯ne welfare in each regime. In the
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present setting, welfare is composed of consumer surplus, aggregate pro¯ts
of the Home ¯rms, and an externality from the resource stock:
UT =
[(n+ n¤)x]2
2
+ n[a¡ c¡ (n+ n¤)x]x+ bST
=
 
kST
2
2
+ n

a¡ c¡ kST
 kST
n+ n¤
+ bST
=
ST
2(n+ n¤)
n
2[nk(a¡ c) + b(n+ n¤)] + k2(n¤ ¡ n)ST
o
; (9)
where the second equation uses the steady state condition: kST = (n +
n¤)x. By setting n¤ = 0, welfare under autarky becomes
UA =
SA
2
n
2[k(a¡ c) + b]¡ k2SA
o
: (10)
The rest of our task is to substitute (7) and (8) into (9) and (10), and
compare them. However, it is so di±cult to obtain a de¯nite result for an
arbitrary r that we restrict attention to the case with r ! 0.10) Then, (7)
and (8) are
STL =
a¡ c
k(n+ n¤ + 1)
; SAL =
a¡ c
k(n+ 1)
: (11)
In this `limit game', we can prove:
Proposition 1. In the linear feedback Nash equilibrium with r ! 0, Home
losses from trade.
Proof. Substituting (11) into (9) and (10), welfare in free trade and autarky
is respectively computed as
UT =

k2(2n+ 1)(a¡ c) + 2bk(n+ n¤ + 1) (a¡ c)
2k2(n+ n¤ + 1)2
UA =

k2(2n+ 1)(a¡ c) + 2bk(n+ 1) (a¡ c)
2k2(n+ 1)2
:
Then, the ratio between UT and UA is
10) Setting r ! 0, which seems very restrictive, is common in di®erential game theory,
e.g., Fershtman and Kamien (1987), Tsutsui and Mino (1990), and Dockner and
Long (1993).
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UT
UA
=
(n+ 1)2

k2(2n+ 1)(a¡ c) + 2bk(n+ n¤ + 1)
(n+ n¤ + 1)2 [k2(2n+ 1)(a¡ c) + 2bk(n+ 1)] :
Subtracting the denominator from the numerator, we have
¡n¤ n¤ k2(2n+ 1)(a¡ c) + 2bk(n+ 1)+ 2(n+ 1) k2(2n+ 1)(a¡ c) + bk(n+ 1)	 < 0;
from which the proposition is established. Q.E.D.
While Proposition 1 is concerned with harmfulness of trade under the lin-
ear feedback strategy, our model can admit an in¯nite number of nonlinear
feedback strategies.11) Following the existing literature, we pay attention
to only one of them, represented by xN in Figure 1.12) Under strategy xN ,
we can state:
Proposition 2. In the feedback Nash equilibrium associated with xN un-
der r ! 0, Home losses from trade.
Proof. See Appendix. Q.E.D.
Propositions 1 and 2 are sharply contrasting to the static result, which
will be brie°y reviewed right now. As has been noted, the static output
x = (a¡c)=(n+n¤+1) can not be an equilibrium strategy in our dynamic
game since it violates asymptotic stability. However, to make transparent
the implication of feedback strategies, it is helpful to know what would
happen if a static output were to be chosen. Then, the steady state stock
of resource becomes
11) For the detailed arguments, see Tsutsui and Mino (1990) and Dockner and Long
(1993). Rowat (2007) rigorously revisits the scope of their arguments.
12) There is no ¯rm reason to stick to xN , but only the steady state stock of resource
achieved by xN can be analytically computed and xN has a very strong implication.
For these reasons, we con¯ne attention to xN only though there are other nonlinear
strategies.
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STC =
(n+ n¤)(a¡ c)
k(n+ n¤ + 1)
; SAC =
n(a¡ c)
k(n+ 1)
; (12)
where the superscript C indicates a static Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Then,
applying the same procedure as that for Proposition 1, we can prove:
Proposition 3. Hypothetically suppose that each ¯rm chooses a static
output. Then, Home gains from trade if and only if
n¤ >
2(n+ 2)[nk(a¡ c)¡ b(n+ 1)]
k(a¡ c) + 2b(n+ 1) : (13)
Proof. The proof is substantially the same as that of Proposition 1. Plug-
ging (12) into (9) and (10), we have UT =UA in this case. Subtracting the
numerator from the denominator in the resulting expression and rearrang-
ing terms yield
n¤

n¤

k2(a¡ c) + 2bk(n+ 1)¡ 2(n+ 1) nk2(a¡ c)¡ bk(n+ 1)	 :
Therefore, (13) is the necessary and su±cient condition for UT =UA > 1.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 is familiar in the literature since condition (13) simpli¯es
to
n¤ > 2n(n+ 1);
when there is no amenity value of resource, i.e., b = 0. This condition states
that Home gains from trade if the number of Foreign ¯rms is su±ciently
larger than that of Home ¯rms. However, such a possibility no longer exists
in the feedback Nash equilibria.
The rest of this section explores why feedback strategies can not allow
a country to gain from trade. To see this, it is convenient to compare
(11) and (12). Let us ¯rst look at (12), the static case where free trade
(foreign entry) expands the industry output and consumer surplus. On the
| 36 |
Fujiwara?The Closed-Loop E®ects of Trade Liberalization in a Dynamic Oligopoly with Renewable Resources
other hand, free trade lowers each Home ¯rm's pro¯t as compared to the
autarkic level. Therefore, the e®ect on welfare is ambiguous and Home can
gain from trade if the increase in consumer surplus overweighs the decrease
in aggregate pro¯ts. Condition (13) ensures this to be the case.
In contrast, both the industry output and consumer surplus decrease
as a result of trade from (11) in the dynamic case. Furthermore, trade
liberalization involves a pro¯t loss to all the Home ¯rms. Accordingly,
trade inevitably leads to welfare losses for Home.13)
Then, a further question arises; why does the industry output decrease
after trade? Benchekroun (2008) provides a clear answer, according to
which there are two e®ects of the opening of trade. First, trade or foreign
entry expands the instantaneous output in the industry as is predicted in
static theory. Second, foreign entry, namely, an increase in the number
of ¯rms exploiting the resource accelerates resource exploitation and the
stock becomes lower. As the resource becomes smaller, each ¯rm has an
incentive to lower output since the feedback strategy (6) is increasing in
S. In the present setting, the latter intertemporal e®ect dominates the
former static e®ect, which results in contraction in the industry output.
To sum, the closed-loop e®ect through S plays a signi¯cant role for losses
from trade.
4 Concluding remarks
Applying Benchekroun's (2008) model of dynamic oligopoly to a home
market where Home and Foreign ¯rms compete, we have identi¯ed that
trade is necessarily harmful to Home, which can be never obtained in a
13) In the case of nonlinear strategy xN in Figure 1, the industry output and consumer
surplus remain the same level while each individual ¯rm's output decreases. Hence,
this pro¯t losses result in welfare losses though consumer surplus does not decrease.
Appendix proves this algebraically.
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static model. It has been discussed that the intertemporal or closed-loop
e®ect of feedback strategies plays an important role for our ¯nding.
While our result could provide a better understanding of the dynamic
implication of trade liberalization, our treatment is based on a number of
simplifying assumptions. The most stringent one is that we have con¯ned
attention to steady states, i.e., we have considered no transition along the
equilibrium strategy. In this sense, our analysis has focused on the long-run
e®ect of trade liberalization. Needless to say, it is more desirable to study
what happens not only in the steady state but also along the transition
path. It is left as our future research agenda.
Appendix: proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that strategy xN is chosen whereby the associated steady state
is N in Figure 1.14) At N , line _S = 0 and the locus of xN is tangent, from
which we have
k
n+ n¤
=
(k ¡ r)
h
(n+ n¤ + 1) kS
n+n¤ ¡ (a¡ c)
i
2(n+ n¤)2 kS
n+n¤ ¡ k(n+ n¤ + 1)S ¡ (n+ n¤ ¡ 1)(a¡ c)
; (14)
where the left-hand side is the slope of line _S = 0 and the right-hand side
is (5) evaluated at the steady state: x = kS=(n+ n¤). Solving (14) for S,
the steady state resource stock achieved by xN becomes
STN =
[k ¡ r(n+ n¤)](a¡ c)
k[2k ¡ r(n+ n¤ + 1)] ; (15)
where subscript N stands for the nonlinear feedback Nash equilibrium.
Setting n¤ = 0, the counterpart under autarky is
SAN =
(k ¡ rn)(a¡ c)
k[2k ¡ r(n+ 1)] : (16)
As in the case of the linear strategy, it is extremely di±cult to obtain a
de¯nite result as long as r is arbitrary. Thus, let us set r ! 0. Then, (15)
14) Itaya and Shimomura (2001) and Rubio and Casino (2002) show that strategy xN
becomes an equilibrium strategy if the initial value of S is in a certain interval.
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and (16) reduce to
STN = S
A
N =
a¡ c
2k
: (17)
This coincidence of the free trade and autarkic resource stocks is well-
known in the literature, e.g., Tsutsui and Mino (1990) and Dockner and
Long (1993). (17) immediately means that the total supply does not change
under free trade and autarky and so does the consumer surplus.
In contrast, the output per-¯rm declines by moving from autarky to free
trade because each ¯rm's output in autarky is (a¡c)=(2kn) which is larger
than that in free trade: (a ¡ c)=[2k(n + n¤)]. Accordingly, each Home
¯rm's pro¯t decreases after trade which leads to welfare losses from trade
by noting that consumer surplus is unchanged even after trade.
Two notes are in order concerning the use of strategy xN . First, strategy
xN is local. As Itaya and Shimomura (2001) and Rubio and Casino (2002)
demonstrate, the initial value of S must be in a certain interval in order
xN to be an equilibrium strategy. On the other hand, the linear strategy
discussed in the main text is global. Any reader should carefully recognize
this local property of xN .
Second, Lemma 6 in Rowat (2007, p. 3193) provides another condition
for xN to be an equilibrium strategy. Someone who knows it may conjec-
ture that his condition is violated in our model and conclude that strategy
xN is eliminated. However, such a guess is incorrect for two reasons. For
one thing, the di®erential equation of constraint in Rowat (2007) is
_Z =
X
xj +
X
x¤j ¡ kZ;
where Z is the world pollution stock. This is di®erent from ours (see (2))
and hence his condition can not straightforwardly be applied to our model.
For another thing, he assumes that ¯rm i's objective is a function of ¯rm i's
control variable and the state variable, i.e., its rival's control variable does
not enter. In contrast, ¯rm i's pro¯t is a function of x¤i as well as xi. In
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other words, the game structure presumed in Rowat (2007) is qualitatively
di®erent from ours so that it is hasty to conclude that strategy xN is
eliminated by applying his condition without any consideration.
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